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Income inequality is more severe in the Unit-
ed States than in any other affluent long-
standing-democratic country, and it has
increased sharply in the past generation.
The rise in inequality is mainly a story of
growing separation between households in
the top 1 percent and those in the ‘‘bottom’’
99 percent. Income inequality within the
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lower 99 percent increased in the 1980s and
1990s, but since then it hasn’t changedmuch.
A common measure of top-end income
inequality is the share of income that goes
to the top 1 percent of households. According
to the World Wealth and Income Database
(Alvaredo et al. 2016), the top 1 percent’s
share of pretax income increased from 18
percent in 1913, the first year of available
data, to 24 percent in 1928. It then fell sharply
during the Great Depression and World War
II to 13 percent in 1945. Between 1945 and the
end of the 1970s it continued to decrease,
slowly but steadily, reaching 10 percent in
1979. By 2014 it had jumped to 21 percent.
For the period since 1979, the Congressional
Budget Office (2016) has compiled estimates
of the top 1 percent’s share of posttax income
(that is, with tax payments subtracted from
income), and the upward trend is similar.
The United States isn’t the only rich demo-
cratic nation to have experienced rising top-
end income inequality since the late 1970s.
The top 1 percent’s income share has risen
sharply in the United Kingdom, Canada,
Ireland, and South Korea too, though not
quite as rapidly as in the U.S. Many other
nations have had more modest increases.
Some, such as Denmark, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, have
seen little or no increase.
A significant part of our surge in top-end
inequality owes to a subset of the top 1 per-
cent. There are about 120 million households
in the United States, so the top 1 percent are
approximately 1.2 million. According to the
World Wealth and Income Database, among
the 600,000 or so that constitute the lower
half of the top 1 percent, average pretax
income roughly doubled between 1979 and
2014, from $275,000 to $500,000. Among the
12,000 households that make up the top 0.01
percent, average income quadrupled during
those years, from $7 million to $29 million.
Of income earners in the top 1 percent,
about one in three are executives, managers,
or supervisors, and one in ten are in financial
professions. These two groups account for
about half of the income share of the top 1
percent and nearly two-thirds of the increase
in that share since the late 1970s (Bakija, Cole,
and Heim 2012). Unlike in the 1920s, most of
their income comes from compensation—
salaries, bonuses, fees, stock options, stock
awards, golden parachutes—rather than
from assets they own (Saez 2015).
The rise in the top 1 percent’s income share
is one of the most striking developments in
the United States in the past generation. It
raises obvious questions of justice, particu-
larly in an era of economic insecurity and
slow income growth for many ordinary
Americans. In addition, according to Richard
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s The Spirit Level,
Joseph Stiglitz’s The Price of Inequality, and
Go¨ran Therborn’s The Killing Fields of
Inequality, high levels or sharp increases in
income inequality may have harmful effects
on other things we value, such as economic
growth, health, happiness, and democracy.
What has caused the surge in top-end
income inequality? Is it a product of changes
in the economy? Or, as Paul Krugman’s The
Conscience of a Liberal and Jacob Hacker and
Paul Pierson’s Winner-Take-All Politics con-
tend, have the key shifts been in America’s
politics and policies?
Education
Explanations of rising income inequality
often begin with education. In The Race
between Education and Technology, Claudia
Goldin and Lawrence Katz describe how
educational attainment in the United States
increased steadily from the late 1800s
through the 1960s. But then the pace of
advance slowed, and as it did, the ‘‘college
pay premium’’—the ratio of the earnings of
persons with a four-year college degree to
the earnings of those without—began to rise.
Goldin and Katz aim to explain develop-
ments in income inequality within the bot-
tom 99 percent, and patterns of educational
attainment are surely helpful for that pur-
pose. But they can’t tell us much about why
the top 1 percent’s incomes have separated
from everyone else in recent decades
becauseAmericans in the top 1 percent aren’t
better educated than those just below them.
That also holds for some other factors com-
monly invoked in explanations of rising
income inequality. High earners more com-
monly couple with other high earners today
than in former generations, but this doesn’t
distinguish the top 1 percent from the rest
of the top 10 or 20 percent of households.
Manufacturing employment has declined,
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the statutory minimum wage has been flat,
and unskilled immigration has risen sharply,
but these are more likely to have contributed
to rising inequality between the middle and
the bottom than between the top and every-
one else.
Product Market Size
In the 1950s, the consumers for America’s
most popular sports team, the New York
Yankees, were primarily people who lived
in New York and purchased tickets to see
the team play in person. Today, top teams
in many sports can be watched by people
all over the world via television. The TV
contracts, along with sales of team jerseys,
hats, and other paraphernalia, havemassive-
ly increased those teams’ revenues. The
same is true for movies, pop music, and fic-
tion books. This in turn has led to huge pay
increases for recognizable sports and enter-
tainment stars. People in Shanghai and Sao
Paulo aremore likely to watch a professional
basketball game or a Hollywood movie if
LeBron James or Tom Hanks is in it. Techno-
logical advance, globalization, and name
recognition have produced large increases
in revenues, and this translates into big
payoffs for superstars.
A related logic applies to the financial sec-
tor. Computerization andmodern communi-
cations technology have enabled a big expan-
sion in the volume of trades, as well as crea-
tion of new financial tools and instruments
(leveraged buyouts, junk bonds, home equi-
ty loans, subprime mortgages, derivatives,
collateralized debt obligations, credit default
swaps). These in turn have increased the vol-
ume of fees earned by large financial firms,
which has made it possible for these compa-
nies to handsomely reward their top creators,
analysts, deal makers, and traders. At the
summit, a superstar investor can set up
a hedge fund, attract tens of billions of
dollars of investment, and charge a yearly
management fee of, say, 3 percent of the
fund’s asset value ($30 million for a fund
with assets of $10 billion) in addition to pock-
eting a share of the returns.
Yet beyond sports, entertainment, and
finance, growth in product market size
probably can’t account for much of the rise
in top-end income inequality. Technological
improvements—large shipping containers,
lighter and stronger packaging materials,
computerized logistics management, the
internet, andmore—have helped to globalize
markets, boosting their size significantly. But
they’ve also brought heightened competi-
tion. American companies now face foreign
competitors not only abroad but also here
in the domestic market. Barriers to entry by
new competitors have fallen too, as venture
capital firms ease access to financing and
the information and communications revolu-
tion enhances the ability of start-ups to join
and utilize global supply chains. As Robert
Reich notes in Supercapitalism, the rate at
which firms disappeared from the Fortune
500 accelerated sharply in the 1970s and
1980s.
Also problematic for the product market
size explanation of rising top-end income
inequality is the fact that many successful
American companies enjoyed soaring reve-
nues in the early post-World War II decades,
before the technology-spurred globalization
of product markets. At Coca-Cola, for
instance, revenues rose from $2 billion in
1955 to $13 billion in 1979, then to $26 billion
in 2005. The story is similar for General
Motors, Procter and Gamble, and many
others. Yet compensation increases for CEOs
(chief executive officers) and other high-level
executives were modest during the former
period, then huge during the latter.
Corporate Governance
In the mid-to-late 1970s, higher-ups in large
American firms began to change their
perceptions of the core mission of the firm,
of whom its most valuable members are,
and of how to compensate them. This shift
had a number of elements.
During the ‘‘golden age’’ of post-World
War II capitalism, boards of directors of large
publicly owned corporations saw the firm’s
mission as increasing market share, reve-
nues, and profits. Profits were invested in
research or equipment, passed on to
employees in the form of wage increases
and new hires, or distributed to shareholders
as dividends. Beginning in the late 1970s, this
orientation was replaced by the notion that
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the principal aim should be to maximize
‘‘shareholder value’’ by increasing the firm’s
stock price. The shift was spurred byMichael
Jensen and William Meckling’s ‘‘Theory of
the Firm’’ article, published in 1976 and
widely embraced in business schools, and
by the growing importance of large institu-
tional investors such as pension funds and
mutual funds.
Wanting to maximize gains for share-
holders doesn’t automatically entail offering
large compensation to high-level executives,
but it just so happened that around the same
time corporate boards began to view top
executives, and in particular the CEO, as
the key to lifting the firm’s share price. There
were a number of reasons for this.
Globalization increased the number of
competitors large American companies
faced, making the firm’s environment seem
more precarious and unstable. Competition
also rose significantly in industries with
purely domestic firms. In retail sales, for
instance, Sears, JC Penney, and countless
small ‘‘mom and pop’’ stores around the
country were now confronted by Walmart,
a hyperefficient and rapidly expanding
behemoth.
Firms also faced a new and growing threat
of external takeover. As Reich points out in
Saving Capitalism, whereas in the 1970s there
were just a dozen hostile takeovers of Amer-
ican firms valued at more than $1 billion, in
the 1980s there were 150. Corporate execu-
tives now had to worry not only about run-
ning the company effectively, battling
competitors, and boosting revenues and
market share. They also had to fend off take-
over attempts. This is no simple task, and
board members, many of whom are them-
selves high-level executives, tend to be sym-
pathetic to the challenge. The takeover threat
eased a bit in the 1990s but then took off
again in the 2000s as private equity firms,
hedge funds, and shareholder activists initi-
ated a new round of buyouts and mergers.
The 1980s also ushered in a new apprecia-
tion of the influence of leaders. Lee Iacocca,
the former Ford executive, was CEO of
Chrysler as it emerged from bankruptcy in
the late 1970s to become profitable and com-
petitive in the 1980s. Though this may have
owed largely to the fact that Chrysler had
stumbled onto what was to become a hugely
popular new type of car, the minivan, the
company’s success accentuated the emerg-
ing cult of the superstar CEO. Other success-
ful CEOs—Bill Gates at Microsoft, Steve Jobs
at Apple, Lou Gerstner at IBM—seemed fur-
ther proof that the key to driving up the
firm’s share price is having the right person
at the helm.
Prior to the 1980s it was common for large
American firms to hire for top executive
positions mainly from within. This meant
budding executives had a financial incentive
to stay put, and it meant they had limited
ability to decamp if they wished to. In the
1980s that norm evaporated, probably
pushed along by a similar development in
sports (baseball free agency began in 1976)
and entertainment. The ability of top execu-
tives to move among firms increased their
leverage in negotiating salaries, bonuses,
and stock options.
As firms increasingly hired CEOs and oth-
er high-level executives from a pool that
included outsiders, and as large compensa-
tion packages became the norm, boards of
directors turned to compensation consul-
tants for information about whom to hire
and howmuch to pay them. This has created
a benchmarking and leapfrogging process
whereby newly hired executives insist on
compensation slightly above most of their
peers, some are granted this demand, and
the norm shifts steadily upward (DiPrete,
Eirich, and Pittinsky 2010).
An additional piece of the corporate gover-
nance story is the coziness between top exec-
utives and the boards of directors who
decide on their compensation packages.
Many members of these boards are in effect
handpicked by the CEO and then approved
by shareholders who have little information
and limited interest in the details of
a company’s governance. Some board
members are executives within the firm
itself, and others are top executives at other
publicly owned companies. They thus have
a direct interest in seeing executive compen-
sation levels rise. In addition, some know
each other personally and hence are more
likely to vote for a generous pay package.
In 1993, the Clinton administration and
Congress ruled that a publicly traded corpo-
ration can deduct executive compensation
from its taxable income only if that
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compensation is tied to the firm’s perfor-
mance. As a result, more and more of execu-
tive compensation began to come in the form
of stock options—shares in the firm that can
be sold after a specified number of years.
As the stock market soared, the payoff from
stock options turned out to be enormous
(Murphy 2013).
Executives also discovered a way to help
temporarily boost their company’s stock
price when it came time to cash in their stock
options: stock buybacks. Purchasing shares
of the firm’s own stock drives up the price
of the stock. It also increases the firm’s earn-
ings per share (by reducing the denomina-
tor), a metric investment analysts use in
judging a firm’s performance. Between 2003
and 2012, firms listed on the Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index used, on average, 54
percent of their earnings to buy back their
own stock (Lazonick 2014).
Because the corporate governance expla-
nation has a number of components, it is dif-
ficult to quantify in a way that allows statis-
tical testing. The explanation works well in
terms of timing in the U.S. case; most of its
components are coincident with the rise in
executive compensation and in the top 1
percent’s income share. It also seemingly
workswell in helping us understand country
differences. In other rich nations, the share-
holder value revolution, CEO free agency,
and compensation via stock options either
didn’t occur at all or happened later than
in the United States. And a number of Euro-
pean countries have institutions—strong
unions and employee election of some
members of the board of directors—that are
likely to obstruct sentiment among corporate
boards in favor of huge executive compensa-
tion packages.
On the other hand, compensation at
the top has risen sharply in a number of
occupations—not just among executives in
publicly traded firms but also among their
counterparts in privately owned companies
and among financial professionals, partners
in large law firms, and top physicians,
athletes, and entertainers (Kaplan and Rauh
2013). So corporate governance shifts can
take us only part of the way in explaining
the rising income share of America’s top 1
percent.
Large-Firm Market Power
Two recent books—Joseph Stiglitz’s Rewrit-
ing the Rules of the American Economy and
Robert Reich’s Saving Capitalism—argue
that the market power of large firms
accounts for a significant share of the growth
in top-end income inequality in the United
States. Firms with a dominant position in
their product market can deter potential
entrants, weaken existing competitors, and
extract more revenue from customers. They
then pass on the resulting above-market
profits, or ‘‘rents,’’ to their top executives.
In Stiglitz’s telling, this process beganwith
government deregulation of key industries
such as airlines and railroads in the 1970s,
eventually extending to telecommunica-
tions, finance, and other industries. Econo-
mists and policy-makers embraced the
notion that ensuring competition via govern-
ment oversight and regulation was unneces-
sary, even counterproductive. Markets,
according to the new perspective, would
ensure ample competition if left alone, par-
ticularly in an age of rapid technological
advance and globalization.
Instead, in industry after industry, we’ve
gotten the opposite—weaker competition,
more firms with a monopoly or quasi-
monopoly position, less pressure for produc-
tivity improvement, more rent-seeking. Pat-
ent and copyright protections give pharma-
ceutical firms and software developers
exclusive access to revenues from a new
innovation. Tech titans benefit when their
service or platform becomes an industry
standard—think Microsoft, Apple, Google,
Facebook, and Amazon. According to Reich,
America’s large banks and other Wall Street
firms have colluded to enlarge their profits
by driving down the price of corporate take-
over targets, influencing the setting of inter-
est rates, engaging in insider trading, and
more. Large firms also use their resources
to lobby for regulations that further advan-
tage them vis-a`-vis competitors, with cable
providers securing local monopoly rights
being only the most visible example.
Yet while market dominance matters for
some firms, this explanation can take us
only so far. We observe sharp increases in
the compensation of CEOs and other high-
level executives across a wide range of
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industries. In howmany of them is the power
of the largest firms greater now than in the
1950s and 1960s, when there was less domes-
tic competition and little globalization? Nei-
ther Stiglitz nor Reich addresses this ques-
tion. Interestingly, the emphasis on large
firm market power and monopoly position
is contrary to what Reich himself described
in his 2007 book, Supercapitalism, which
emphasized the increase in competitive
pressure faced by American firms.
Financialization
Over the past century, the financial sector’s
share of America’s GDP has correlated fairly
strongly with the top 1 percent’s share of
income; it was high in the 1920s, then lower
for about 50 years, then high again since the
late 1970s. Financial firms’ revenues have
grown in recent decades, and the salaries
and bonuses of top financial managers,
traders, and analysts have risen sharply.
The amounts for some, particularly hedge
fund managers, are staggering. Moreover,
many large nonfinancial companies have
added financial operations such as loans
and credit cards on top of their core
business.
The expansion of finance has multiple
causes. Globalization, the emergence of large
institutional investors, advances in comput-
ing and telecommunications, the creation of
new financial instruments, and reductions
in regulatory constraints have allowed finan-
cial companies to draw on larger pools of
funds and to channel those funds into awider
array of investments. The growing size of
large financial firms has allowed them to
seek more risky investments. This has been
accentuated by the expectation of a govern-
ment bailout should too many of those bets
go sour, on the grounds that a bankruptcy
by one or more such firms would create
too much uncertainty in global financial
markets. Nonfinancial companies, strug-
gling in a more competitive global economy
and facing investor demands for strong
short-term profit performance, have turned
to financial operations to shore up revenues
and profits.
Finance clearly has contributed to Amer-
ica’s top-heavy increase in income inequality
(Philippon and Reshef 2013; Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin 2013; Flaherty 2015). It too,
however, is only part of the story. Financial
professionals get one-seventh of the top 1
percent’s income, and they account for about
one-quarter of the rise in its income share
(Bakija et al. 2012). The financial sector’s
share of income actually has been rising since
the 1950s,whereas the top 1 percent’s income
share only began to increase around 1980.
And if we look across countries, we find
a number of anomalies. For instance, the
Netherlands and Japan look similar to the
United States in over-time trends in financial
regulation, in finance’s share of income or
value-added, and in financial-sector wages
relative to wages in nonfinancial sectors,
yet they are among the rich countries in
which the top 1 percent’s share of income
has risen the least over the past generation.
The Stock Market
An important but little-commented-upon
part of the story of rising top-end income
inequality in the United States is the rise in
stock prices. The S&P 500 is a common mea-
sure of stock-market values. Over the six
decades since the mid-1950s, the correlation
between the inflation-adjusted value of the
S&P 500 and the top 1 percent’s income
share is 10.92. Both were flat through the
late 1970s and then shot up.
As I noted earlier, most of the income gains
for America’s top 1 percent have come
from increases in compensation rather than
in capital income. Yet a lot of the movement
in compensation over time is tied to the stock
market. A large portion of the mammoth
compensation increases for high-level execu-
tives in big firms has come in the form of
stock options, which hinge on increases in
the share price of the executive’s firm. A
key part of the rise in pay for financial profes-
sionals is linked to trading in stocks and
related financial instruments, which tends
to increase when stocks’ values rise.
The growth of incomes among the top 1
percent also fuels rising stock values. The
rich tend to save and invest a larger portion
of their income than do middle-class and
poor households, so as the incomes of those
at the top soar, more money will go toward
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purchase of stocks, increasing the demand
for them and hence their price.
When we turn to other rich nations, stock
values aren’t always helpful in accounting
for changes in top-end income inequality. In
a handful of countries, the over-time correla-
tion is as strong as in the United States. In
others, though, it is weak or nonexistent.
Unions
Where unions exist and are sufficiently
strong, they can force firms to distribute
more of the profits to ordinary workers and
less to top executives. Computers, robots,
the ability to move to another state or coun-
try, immigration, high unemployment rates,
and other developments have increased
employers’ leverage vis-a`-vis workers, and
in this context union strength is likely to be
especially critical. Unions also can affect
income inequality via a political channel,
by pressuring policy-makers and influenc-
ing election outcomes.
The unionization rate in the United States
has declined sharply during the period of ris-
ing top-end income inequality, falling from
23 percent in 1979 to 10 percent in 2014.
Then again, the drop in unionization began
in the 1950s, and the decrease in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s was comparable to what
has happened since.
Cross-county comparison suggests that
union strength has mattered for income
inequality. The contrast between the United
States and Canada is illustrative. Canada’s
unionization rate has remained fairly con-
stant over the past generation, and the top 1
percent’s income share in Canada has risen
only half asmuch as in theU.S. Several recent
quantitative studies that examine develop-
ments over the past generation in the United
States alone or in the U.S. along with other
affluent democracies have found unioniza-
tion to be one of the best predictors of varia-
tion in top-end income inequality (Volscho
and Kelley 2013; Jaumotte and Buitron
2015; Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2015).
In this instance, however, the best predic-
tor isn’t an especially good predictor. The
only one of these studies that provides infor-
mation needed to gauge the magnitude of
unions’ impact has it predicting a rise in the
top 1 percent’s income share in the United
States of 0.5 percentage points. The actual
rise was 10 percentage points.
Taxes
Analyses of the impact of taxes on income
inequality typically focus on how a progres-
sive tax system reduces the share of income
that goes to the rich, and accounts of the
rise of top-end inequality in the United
States often point to the Reagan and (George
W.) Bush tax cuts as key contributors. How-
ever, the best estimates we have of the top 1
percent’s posttax income share, from the
Congressional Budget Office, suggest that
those tax cuts didn’t in fact do much to
change the picture. And tax changes during
the Obama presidency have brought the
effective federal tax rate (taxes paid as
a share of pretax income) on the top 1 per-
cent back up to the level it was at in 1979.
Taxes may have a larger influence on the
pretax distribution of income. Two recent
books—Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the
Twenty-First Century and Kenneth Scheve
and David Stasavage’s Taxing the Rich—
suggest that when top statutory income tax
rates are lower, people and households at
the top have greater incentive to try to max-
imize their income. They may do so by
working harder or smarter, or perhaps by
grabbing more ‘‘rent.’’
In the United States, the top statutory fed-
eral income tax rate and the top 1 percent’s
share of pretax income have indeed tended
to move in opposite directions over time. In
the 1920s the top tax rate decreased and the
top 1 percent’s income share shot up. The
top tax rate rose sharply between 1929 and
1945, and the top 1 percent’s income share
fell sharply. From 1979 to 2007, the top tax
rate decreased a good bit and the top 1
percent’s income share jumped.
However, there are notable exceptions.
The 1963 Kennedy tax reform reduced the
top statutory tax rate from 90 to 70 percent,
yet the top 1 percent’s pretax income share
continued its slow, steady post-World War
II decline. In the early 1990s the (first) Bush
administration and the Clinton administra-
tion increased the top tax rate from 28 to 40
percent, yet the top 1 percent’s income share
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continued its sharp post-1979 rise. Carola
Frydman and Raven Molloy (2011) have
looked closely at whether compensation for
top executives in large U.S. firms changes
in response to shifts in top statutory tax rates.
Drawing on data going back to the 1940s,
they find no noteworthy correlation between
top tax rates and executive compensation.
What does the experience of other coun-
tries suggest? Data are available for most of
the rich longstanding democracies since the
mid-1970s. In some of them—Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom, along
with the United States—we observe the
predicted increase in the top 1 percent’s
income share when the top statutory tax
rate decreases. But in others—Denmark,
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
and Sweden—we don’t.
All of these countries reduced top income
tax rates during this period, but they differed
significantly in the degree of reduction.
Did the nations with larger decreases in
top tax rates experience larger increases in
their top 1 percent’s income share? Yes,
but the correlation isn’t especially strong
(Kenworthy 2016b). Particularly noteworthy
is that four English-speaking countries—the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Australia—are among those with the
largest increase in the top 1 percent’s income
share even though only one of them,
the United States, enacted very large tax-
rate reductions.
Why isn’t the association stronger? Part of
the reason is that hiding behind statutory tax
rates are an assortment of loopholes, deduc-
tions, and ‘‘tax expenditures.’’ These reduce
the effective tax rate on persons or house-
holds with high incomes by shielding some,
potentially much, of their pretax income
from taxation. Warren Buffett’s famous dis-
covery that he pays a lower effective federal
income tax rate than his office staff illustrates
the point. Moreover, different parts of high
incomes—salary, business income, capital
gains—may be taxed at different rates.
What Do We Know?
Researchers tend to search for a dominant
cause. We want to identify the most impor-
tant determinant, partly because finding
one reduces complexity and partly because
it implies a straightforward solution to the
problem. Much of the research on the rise
of top-end income inequality has proceeded
in this vein, with analysts focusing on one or
another hypothesized cause and frequently
concluding that it is indeed the key contrib-
utor. I don’t think any such conclusion is jus-
tified. The rise in the top 1 percent’s income
share since the late 1970s is a product of mul-
tiple developments—growth in product
market size, shifts in corporate governance,
increases in the market power of some large
firms, financialization, soaring stock values,
union decline, and reductions in top tax
rates—no one or two or even three of which
look to have been dominant or decisive.
To some degree it’s pure historical coinci-
dence that these developments occurred
around the same time. But they also rein-
forced and accentuated one another.
Is the origin of these developments mostly
economic or mostly political? Are they, in
other words, a product of markets or a prod-
uct of policy? My answer is: both. Deregula-
tion, tax cuts at the top, the 1993 cap on
deductibility of non-performance-related
executive compensation, lack of support for
labor unions, and other policy actions and
inactions have played an important role.
But so too have technological advances, the
expansion of markets, changes in corporate
culture, and other economic developments.
And even where policy has mattered, it
hasn’t necessarily been decisive. Deregula-
tion of finance is a prominent culprit in
many accounts of rising income inequality,
yet nearly all affluent nations had deregu-
lated their financial sectors as much as the
United States by the early 1990s, with many
experiencing nothing like our surge in top-
end income inequality. And unions have
weakened not only here in the Unites States,
but in many other affluent countries, some of
which have a much less hostile legal climate.
Just as there is no single dominant cause of
the rise in top-end income inequality, there is
unlikely to be a silver bullet when it comes to
solutions. Here Anthony Atkinson’s Inequal-
ity: What Can Be Done? is helpful, offering
a menu of reasonable and practical
proposals for policy steps, from higher tax
rates on top incomes to guaranteed employ-
ment to more generous government benefits
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and much more. If fully implemented,
Atkinson’s slate of recommendations might
well take us a significant part of the way
toward reversing the past generation’s shift
in favor of the top 1 percent.
How vital is it to achieve that? While
hypotheses about income inequality’s harm-
ful effects on other social, economic, and
political outcomes abound, supportive evi-
dence is sparse (Kenworthy 2016a). For
some of these outcomes, perhaps many, pol-
icy changes that aim to improve outcomes
directly, rather than indirectly via income
inequality reduction, may be a better
approach. There is, arguably, a strong case
for attempting to reduce top-end income
inequality on fairness grounds alone. But
even this is subject to caveat, for a variety
of policy reforms that would enhance socie-
tal fairness, from early education to fully uni-
versal health insurance to affordable housing
and college, could be achieved with little or
no shift in the distribution of income. Income
inequality ought to be on the list of problems
in need of attention from American policy-
makers, but it isn’t clear that it should be at
the top of the list.
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